We evaluated the efficacy of a computer-based situation awareness (SA) measurement system for training dismounted infantry SA in an urban terrain virtual reality (VR) simulation. Based on past research, we hypothesized that the SA measures would be sensitive to individual (squad leader) differences, and that the frequency of specific probes would reveal differences in critical SA requirements among scenarios. Three infantry squads performed multiple trials across two different scenarios. A confederate platoon leader posed probes to squad leaders during trials and experts made ratings afterward. Results revealed squad leaders had similar responses to probes, despite differences in combat experience. Analysis of probe frequency revealed different high priority SA elements and decisions for each scenario. The SA behavior and communication ratings revealed differences among squads, which trended with experience. Measures of SA were also consistent across the test scenario as a result of similar mission types and task difficulties. We discuss the implication of our findings for future research and theory within this area.
abilities (Endsley & Bolstad, 1994; Gugerty & Tirre, 1997; O'Hare, 1997) ; task and environmental factors (Hockey, 1986; Sharit & Salvendy, 1982) ; doctrine or accepted tactics (Taylor, Endsley, & Henderson, 1996) ; and available sources of SA, including team members and information technologies (Kaber & Endsley, 1998; Endsley et al., 2000) .
Research shows that relevant experience plays a significant role in a soldier's ability to quickly form and maintain SA in time-critical operations (Lampton, Riley, Kaber, & Endsley, 2006; Pleban, Eakin, Salter, & Matthews, 2001) . Experience related to achieving and maintaining SA can be gained through effective training programs with appropriate feedback on trainee performance. Custom scenarios can be designed to facilitate soldier practice in perception, comprehension, and projection of dynamic situations. Feedback on SA through AARs (After-Action Reviews) is expected to promote soldier understanding of why different types of battlefield errors may occur, including missing information, failing to relate states of the environment (terrain) to action, and failing to predict the need for specific tactics. Such feedback can also provide important indicators of soldier readiness for actual combat.
The U.S. Army currently uses virtual reality (VR)-based simulation systems to train infantry units in dismounted operations, including combat missions, and to facilitate advanced mission rehearsal (Hamilton & Holmquist, 2005) . Training scenarios typically involve squads or rifle teams in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT-e.g., roving [virtual] patrols, crowd control, attacks on buildings, suppressing enemy insurgents, dealing with hostage situations). The majority of these scenarios employ human simulation operators to role-play opposition forces. The high-level tasks of all virtual missions are to fight and overcome hostile threats. Past research has shown that training in VR simulations can be an effective way to improving soldier decision-making and situation-assessment abilities (Lampton et al., 2006; Pleban et al., 2001) with reduced cost and resources as compared to traditional field training. However, measuring soldier SA in virtual environments remains a challenge.
Although there are various approaches to measure soldier SA (Kaber, Riley, Lampton, & Endsley, 2005) , they are not without their limitations. Matthews, Pleban, Endsley, and Strater (2000) noted that it may be difficult to freeze a large-scale simulation or field exercise as required by the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT; Endsley, 1995a) without compromising trainee performance. Similarly, the Situation-Present Assessment Method (SPAM; Durso et al., 1998) employs freezes for SA queries, and this procedure may still affect operator task performance. Real-time SA probe measures (Jones & Endsley, 2000) question trainees on SA during ongoing tasks and provide some advantages over SAGAT and SPAM because they can be developed to be part of normal training task communications. However, it is often difficult to achieve the necessary sample size on SA queries for reliable assessments because of simulation events and operator workload levels. Other techniques involving expert observer rating of specific soldier behaviors (e.g., the Situation Awareness Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale (SABARS; Strater, Endsley, Pleban, & Matthews, 2001 ) and communications for achieving SA (e.g., Wright & Kaber, 2003) allow for assessment of components of SA and can be conducted in real time during soldier training without intrusion on performance. The Coordinated Awareness of Situation by Teams (CAST; Gorman, Cooke, & Winner, 2006) focuses on coordinated processes involved in a team adapting to nonroutine situational constraints like a "roadblock." However, introducing artificial roadblocks or unlikely events into military training simulations may interfere with primary task performance and consequently affect the validity of the training.
This research begins to address shortcomings of past studies on the assessment of soldier SA by examining the efficacy of an SA measurement system designed to support enhanced feedback for soldiers during AARs following Army VR-based training exercises. The measurement system takes advantage of the customizability and flexibility of virtual environments while avoiding some of the common limitations of SA measures discussed previously. The SA measurement system integrated real-time probes as a direct, objective measure of squad leader SA, complemented with expert observer ratings of SA behaviors and squad communications as subjective measures. Each of the selected measures (probes and expert ratings) was expected to provide different insights into squad leader SA. The SA probe measure was intended to evaluate battlefield awareness in the mind of the squad leaders. The SA behavior ratings were to measure squad leader ability to act based on SA. The communication ratings were to measure squad leader ability to distribute SA to squad members in order to facilitate shared understanding of combat situations and knowledge of mission requirements.
In this article, we examined the sensitivity of the specific measures to individual differences in soldier ability to achieve SA; the reliability of the measures for assessing soldier SA across similar simulated combat conditions in VR; and assessed soldier perceptions of combat task workload in order to determine if there were any differences among training scenarios and to identify any relation with SA. Before presenting the results of our study, we describe the development of the SA measurement tool. Subsequently, we present the methodology and results and conclude with a discussion that outlines the theoretical, research, and practical implications of our work for future research in this area.
Development of SA Measurement Tools
We developed three software applications to implement probing and expert observer ratings. The automated probe delivery application (APDA) was used to present potential probes to platoon leaders based on training scenario events (e.g., squad falls under sniper attack), squad communications (e.g., leader situation report), and/or the specific locations of squad members in the virtual training environment (VTE) at any given time. The electronic SA behavior measurement (ESABM) application included 27 target squad leader behaviors considered to represent consistency with acquisition and dissemination of SA, each with a 10-point scale to be rated by expert analysts. The situation awareness measure of team communication and coordination (SAMTC) application supported expert analysts' ratings of solider team communications in terms of SA. Both the ESABM and SAMTC were presented on tablet PCs connected wirelessly to a database on the APDA workstation.
Real-Time Probe Measure
SA probes. Following Jones and Endsley (2000) , we used cognitive task analysis to develop a database of SA requirements for squad leaders in MOUT missions. Structured interviews were conducted with reservist or retired senior military officers. Goal-Directed Task Analysis (GDTA; Endsley, 1993) was used to identify soldier goal states for MOUT, identifying operational tasks to achieving the goals, identifying specific questions as part of decision making in task performance, and establishing the SA requirements to answer questions. SA requirements resulting from the analysis were categorized according to the levels of SA defined by Endsley (1995b) . The requirements were then translated into natural language probes to be posed to squad leaders during training trials by a confederate platoon leader (also directing squad actions) over a communications network.
We integrated probes into communications between soldier trainees and experienced military personnel to guide training trials. This method differs from verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1998) , as subjects are not merely asked to verbalize what they are doing and why, but they are asked about specific SA requirements for a task. The probe measurement technique also requires experimenters to determine in real time whether subject responses are correct relative to the ground truth of a simulation. This scoring information is stored in a database through the APDA to support AARs as part of a training exercise.
SA probe tool. The APDA interface presented an overview map of the VTE on which virtual markers were overlaid to identify locations for administration of SA probes to squad leaders. Moving icons were used to represent squad member avatar positions in the VTE, as an exercise played out. When the icon for a squad leader avatar contacted a probe marker, the APDA presented a list of appropriate probes for a platoon leader to choose from. The application interface (see Figure 1 ) included dialogs for selecting probes and responses from trainees, as well as recording "ground truth" information on the simulation. At the close of a training trial, the APDA automatically calculated the percent of correct soldier responses to probes at each level of SA.
Depending upon the training scenario, there were between 60 and 70 probes for platoon leaders to choose from. Jones and Endsley (2000) recommended that high numbers of probes be used in order to achieve sufficient reliability and sensitivity in assessing SA. They probed air defense system operators, on average, once every 2 minutes and found no evidence of interference with performance. They also suggested that probes could be administered more often without posing problems. In our use of the APDA, we did not require confederate platoon leaders to deliver specific probes a certain number of times during trials. They were, however, asked to attempt to deliver at least 15 probes per trial and to distribute probes across levels of SA. This procedure gave the platoon leaders freedom to choose probes based on training objectives and their knowledge of what was important for the simulated combat situation and why. This type of flexibility in real-time probe delivery was not possible in previous studies. After each trial, we analyzed the frequency with which platoon leaders delivered probes from the database. We considered the applicability of probes throughout the course of a training trial as another measure for revealing SA elements the experts considered to be of high priority for different MOUT missions. This form of real-time probe data analysis represents a new approach to verifying SA requirements for specific missions based on expert knowledge.
Behavior Measures
The ESABM application was developed based on the situation awareness behaviorally anchored rating scale (SABARS) created by Strater et al. (2001) . The SABARS requires an expert to evaluate soldier behaviors for consistency with SA subsequent to observing an exercise . The original SABARS consisted of 28 questions (or behaviors) with relevance to SA in combat missions. The behaviors were specific to assessment of platoon leader SA. Instead of creating a post-trial measure for squad leader SA assessment, we worked with a military expert to identify squad leader behaviors having relevance to SA in MOUT missions that could be rated during a training exercise. This resulted in 27 target squad leader behaviors for SA analyst observation and rating in real time. The behaviors are shown in Figure 2 , as displayed in the ESABM application interface. The real-time ratings represent an enhancement over the original SABARS and serve to eliminate analyst recall bias in behavior ratings.
To apply the ESABM, a SA analyst watched a squad leader's motion behavior during a trial and monitored leader communications with other squad members. Analysts were able to record multiple ratings on each behavior during a single trial and the ESABM automatically averaged the ratings. At the close of a trial, the application calculated an overall SA score by summing the rating data across the target behaviors.
Communication Measures
The SAMTC facilitated expert observer ratings of specific soldier team communications in terms of SA. We adapted the approach used by Wright and Kaber (2003) and Brannick, Prince, Prince, and Salas (1995) (for team communication and coordination analyses) to the analysis of squad leader achievement of SA through requests for, and dissemination of, information within a squad. The SAMTC represents a novel approach to soldier SA assessment based on real-time communication ratings. The measurement technique required experts to monitor all verbalizations via the squad communications network during an exercise. Raters classified target verbalizations in terms of the elements of MOUT (e.g., enemies, friendlies, terrain, civilians, etc.). Soldier statement quality ratings ("good" or "bad") were also made in real time during exercises. An overall rating of the quality of squad leader SA (on a scale from 1 [no 
Hypotheses
In general, it was hypothesized that the SA measures, behavior, and communication ratings would reveal individual differences in SA related to soldier combat experience and intact versus unfamiliar squad configurations in training exercises (Hypothesis 1). As a result of training scenario feature manipulations, different conditions were expected to yield comparable levels of SA (Hypothesis 2); however, the measurement system (in particular, the analysis of SA probe frequency) was expected to reveal different aspects of SA most critical to each mission (Hypothesis 3). (This analysis also allowed us to relate general mission features back to SA requirements.) The SA measures were also expected to be related to squad perceptions of task workload, if they fluctuated among scenarios or trials. In particular, SA was expected to decrease as combat workload increased (Hypothesis 4).
Method Participants
Three Army infantry squads, with nine members each, were recruited for participation in a "training research exercise" to evaluate the SA measurement tools. Two of the squads were intact; the soldiers comprised actual combat units. The third squad was comprised of soldiers that had not previously worked together. All soldiers ranged in age from 19 to 32 years. The majority (23 of 27) indicated prior participation in live MOUT site training (e.g., at Fort Polk). Only one soldier had previously participated in VE-based training through the Army. Twelve of the soldiers reported actual combat experience in the wars in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.
Measures
SA. Dependent variables included squad leader answers to the real-time probes in terms of the percentage of correct responses, and expert ratings of SA behavior and team communications. With respect to the post-hoc probing frequency analysis, we counted the number of times probes were delivered during trials and then totaled all counts across trials for each of the two scenarios. Two expert SA analysts applied the rating techniques in each trial with one rater evaluating soldier behaviors in all SP (Security Patrol) scenarios and soldier communications in all AC (Arms Cache Discovery) scenarios, and the other doing the exact opposite. Overall scores for consistency of soldier actions with SA, and the quality of team communications, were recorded for each trial for each squad leader.
Task workload. Each squad member (including leaders) was required to rate the level of task workload for each trial (scenario type) using a visual analog scale with anchors of low and high. A univariate scale was chosen instead of a multivariate measure (e.g., NASA-TLX questionnaire) because the task workload was intended to characterize the overall demand on soldier information processing and physical actions (cf., Hendy, Hamilton, & Landry, 1993) .
Feedback ratings. Soldiers were asked to rate different types of feedback they received during AARs, following the training trials. They rated the utility of platoon leader feedback on mission knowledge, their behaviors, and communications as a basis for improving combat skills. These ratings were also made on a scale with anchors of low and high. Individual ratings were averaged across a squad for a single score on each type of feedback.
Apparatus, Design, and Procedures
Nine immersive VR booths were used for the study, each with a single 12.5= ϫ 7= rearprojection screen displaying virtual battlefield imagery to soldiers. The booths also included integrated mock-ups of infantry weapons (e.g., M-16/M4 rifles), which were instrumented with interface controls (a thumbstick and two pushbuttons) to facilitate environment navigation and selection of equipment for avatar use (e.g., virtual night-vision goggles, compass, grenade launcher, flares, flash bangs, etc.). Soldiers were required to don a helmet and rucksack when entering a booth. Motion tracking system receivers were attached to the weapon system and helmet. The receivers provided data on soldier posture position and orientation of viewpoint, which were used to drive basic motions of the avatars in the VTE (e.g., standing, kneeling, and prone). Each VR booth also included a radio headset with hand control for soldier use and a "listen-only" headset for the expert observers. The radios allowed members of the training squad to communicate with each other and the squad leader to contact a platoon leader. In one of the two training scenarios, soldiers also used interfaces on the weapon mock-up to mark rooms of buildings (with virtual paint) in order to prevent duplication of squad search efforts. In the other scenario, they used the weapon interfaces to deploy smoke to conceal squad movement across open streets.
The type of training scenario was manipulated as a within-subjects variable (i.e., all squad leaders were exposed to both a SP and AC scenario). Each squad completed three trials under each scenario with changes in the time of day of the simulation (daylight vs. night), the weather (clear vs. fog/rain), and the number of squad casualties occurring during trials (0, 1, 2). Combinations of these scenario features were selected to balance the level of difficulty from one trial to the next. Squad leaders were exposed to the scenarios in the same order based on a predefined training approach. The sequence of trials was also determined based on the goals of the Army training exercise.
The mission of the roving SP was to secure a food convoy route in a small town. On route to a warehouse, the squad was directed to watch for and impede any insurgent activity. They ultimately encountered an armed civilian, who was to be disarmed. While detaining the civilian, a sniper engaged the squad from a water tower. An RPG (Rocket-propelled Grenade) team subsequently destroyed a Red Cross vehicle on a street near the squad. Civilian and friendly force casualties occurred as result of these activities. The squad was required to deal with the casualties and continue on to the warehouse for the delivery. In the AC discovery scenario, a squad was assigned several (virtual) buildings in the small town for clearing and search for arms and contraband. During the search, a civilian approached the squad claiming knowledge of a cache site and asked that the squad follow him. In so doing, the squad encountered a car bomb and small arms fire from a three-man insurgent element in a nearby building. In some trials, the squad took casualties during the firefight and was required to defuse the situation and secure the AC. The objective of both scenarios was to train the squads on tactics in dealing with small unit insurgent threats and noncombatant issues typical to urban environments, as well as the importance of achieving accurate battlefield awareness.
The experimental procedure for each squad spanned 2 days. The first day included: (1) an introduction to the training facility and identification of the goals for the event (about 45 min); (2) familiarization with the VR equipment and simulation (about 1 hour); (3) trainee assignment to virtual fire-teams (about 15 min); and (4) performance in three training trials (about 1 hour and 30 min each). Each training trial involved a mission briefing by a confederate platoon leader and an operations order by the squad leader (about 25 min). During a training scenario, real-time probes were posed to squad leaders by platoon leaders via the communication network. Expert observers also made ratings of squad team SA behaviors and communications. Once a squad completed a virtual mission, or was rendered "combat ineffective," the trial was terminated. The soldiers then completed the combat workload ratings and were provided with an AAR (about 30 min). The platoon leader guided a discussion of critical events in the training scenario; soldier behaviors and communications; and tactical decision making. Recommendations were provided for improving SA and performance in subsequent trials (this approach was consistent among squads and trials). At the close of an AAR, soldiers completed the feedback ratings. The second day of the experiment included: (1) a reorientation to the goals and equipment (about 45 min); (2) three more training trials (about 1 hour and 30 min each); and (3) an exercise debriefing (about 45 min with ARI researchers). Soldiers were asked to provide comments on the feedback they received through the AARs.
Results
With each squad completing six training trials, there were a total of 18 observations per response measure. Data were limited in part due to the availability of the Army training facility and actual infantry squads. Related to this, variations in response measures from one training trial to the next may have been correlated due to the use of the AARs. Consequently, parametric statistical tests (assuming independence of observations) were not used for data analyses. A nonparametric counterpart to the analysis of variance (ANOVA), the Kruskal-Wallis test, was applied.
Analyses on Hypotheses 1 and 2
With respect to the real-time probe measure, Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed no significant main effect of squad leader (subject; t(2) ϭ 1.632, p ϭ .4422) or scenario type, t(1) ϭ 0.3516, p ϭ .5532 on percent correct responses to probes. In general, squad leader overall SA was high, ranging from approximately 83% to 96% accurate. Variations in SA across trials were substantial, and this may have led to a lack of sensitivity of the statistical test for revealing average differences, which was counter to Hypothesis 1. In support of Hypothesis 2, the manipulation of the various scenario features appeared to yield comparable levels of soldier SA. (It is important to note that the probe measure did reveal internal validity in that significant positive correlations occurred between total SA and measures on each level of SA; perception, comprehension, and projection.).
With respect to the expert observer ratings of soldier behaviors for consistency with SA, Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed a significant effect of squad leader, t(2) ϭ 13.1147, p ϭ .0014 on the overall ESABM scores. This was in agreement with Hypothesis 1. As posited in Hypothesis 2, the pattern of SA-related behaviors was consistent across scenario types, t(1) ϭ 1.4629, p ϭ .2262. Pairwise comparisons of the ESABM scores for the various squad leaders revealed significant differences (pϽ .05) among all leaders, which appeared to correspond with actual experience. Squad Leader #1 had the most experience and achieved a mean score of 8.25/10. Squad Leader # 2 was new to the post and achieved the worst score (4.875/10) in leading an unfamiliar squad. Squad Leader #3 achieved a mean score of 7.125/10. Although Squad Leader #3 appeared to have more relevant MOUT experience than Squad Leader #1, he had five fewer years of service.
In regard to the team communications measure of SA, Kruskal-Wallis tests also revealed a significant effect of the squad leader, t(2) ϭ 10.8348, p ϭ .0044 on the overall communication quality ratings by experts. This was also in agreement with Hypothesis 1. In support of Hypothesis 2, there was no significant effect of the MOUT scenario type, t(1) ϭ 0.6689, p ϭ .4135. Pairwise comparisons of the mean SAMTC scores revealed significant differences (pϽ .05) among all leaders, which also appeared to correspond with military experience. Leader #2 was rated worse than Leaders #1 and #3, and Leader #1 was rated superior to #3.
A correlation analysis revealed that the expert behavior ratings were significantly correlated with communication ratings (r ϭ .90, pϽ .0001). This suggested that communication is a critical part of team behavior, and that there was some consistency across measures within the SA measurement system. The two ratings were, however, not correlated with squad leader SA assessed using the real-time probes.
Analysis on Hypothesis 3
The analysis of the frequency of platoon leader probe use revealed high-priority SA requirements for each scenario (Hypothesis 3). In the SP scenario, 16 out of 65 queries (ϳ25% of the database) were posed to squad leaders on at least two or more occasions. In the AC scenario, 21 out of 63 probes (33%) were posed to squad leaders on at least two or more occasions. Table  1 presents the "top" six probes for the SP scenario in terms of frequency of use. Two probes were posed to squad leaders 10 or more times, and four probes were posed on five or more occasions. It can be inferred that if a particular probe was used frequently, the SA requirement underlying the probe was critical to the target mission. The table reveals platoon leaders focused on squad leader awareness of the position of their unit, movement of the enemy, and projecting where they might be, and civilian activity during the scenario. These SA requirements were associated with various mission features, including the need to secure a defined route and prevent insurgents and civilians from interfering with the convoy. The requirements were also related to mission subgoals, including evaluating routes, avoiding fire fights, projecting enemy action, maneuvering against the enemy and preventing collateral damage. Table 2 presents the "top" eight probes for the AC scenario. Four probes were posed five or more times and four probes were posed on four or more occasions. Another 13 probes were posed two or more times. Again, it was inferred that high-frequency probes indicated highpriority SA requirements for the training scenario. The table reveals platoon leaders were concerned with squad leader knowledge of enemy location and capability to detect the squad, as well as whether the squad could take cover. They also appeared to be concerned with specific threats to the unit and if they could eliminate the enemy, as well as the squad remaining mission worthy and being able to clear buildings. Furthermore, they were frequently concerned with endangering civilians during the scenario. These knowledge requirements were associated with scenario features, including dealing with a car bomb and insurgent team attack, and protecting people evacuating a school. The SA requirements were also related to mission subgoals, including assessing and avoiding threats, maneuvering against the enemy and occupying terrain, and ensuring effective squad and civilian security. Other squad leader decisions related to these subgoals are presented in the table. Due to differences in the high-priority SA requirements identified for each scenario, statistical comparisons of probing frequency among scenarios was not conducted as a further basis for assessing Hypothesis 3. 
Analysis on Hypothesis 4
Statistical analyses on squad leader ratings of mental workload during training trials revealed almost identical perceptions across leaders, t(2) ϭ 0.0356, p ϭ .9823. On average, the percent load determined for Leader #2 was slightly lower than for Leaders #1 and #3; however, any differences were not statistically significant. There was also no evidence of an effect of scenario type on leader workload ratings, t(1) ϭ 2.2888, p ϭ .1303. This was in line with expectation, based on the manipulation of scenario features. In relation to Hypothesis 4, correlation analyses on perceived combat workload and squad leader SA did not reveal significant linear associations in either the SP or AC scenarios. More specifically, leader SA did not appear to degrade with increasing workload. This was the case for total SA, and Level 1, 2 and 3 SA measured using the real-time probe technique.
Result of Soldier Feedback
With respect to the soldier evaluations of the quality of various types of SA-based feedback through AARs, we found ratings of mission knowledge, behavior, and communications feedback to range from approximately 62% to 91% (on a 100-point scale). In general, results suggested additional feedback, as part of AARs, based on the outcomes of the SA measures would be perceived as useful by training squads in regular exercises to develop SA and combat decision skills.
Discussion
In this section, we provide explanations of why certain results might have occurred with the new SA measurement tools during the training study. On this basis, we identify any shortcomings of our techniques and lessons learned for further development of such tools as well as applications. We also identify the types of knowledge that can be gained with each method and improvements in SA measurement over other existing approaches.
Real-Time Probe Measure
In the present study, the automated probe delivery tool was used to pose, on average, 19 SA probes to soldiers per training trial. This amounts to one probe every 1.6 minutes during the course of a 30-min trial. These numbers are important because results on the real-time SA probes suggested some lack of sensitivity to individual differences among squad leaders. As previously mentioned, Jones and Endsley (2000) probed air defense system operators, on average, once every 2 minutes. According to Jones and Endsley's (2000) recommendation for probing at least every 30 seconds, we would have needed to probe soldiers 60 or more times in each training trial to promote sensitivity of our analyses on measures of the various levels of SA. The lesson learned here is that high numbers of probes are needed as a basis for statistical analysis of SA data but such probes must be effectively integrated into scenario communications so as not to detract from soldier task performance. In our case, the low numbers of probes were primarily due to squads executing tactical maneuvers not anticipated by the research team and limiting the number of virtual probe markers encountered by a squad leader. That is, the number of opportunities for a platoon leader to pose queries was limited by creative squad operations. From a tactical perspective, squad leader behavior demonstrated critical training and experience. From the perspective of assessing SA, their behaviors reduced the potential utility of the measurement approach for supporting feedback during AARs. In general, in designing and applying such an SA probing tool, researchers need to be able to foresee potential trainee behaviors in order to maximize opportunities for delivering probes. (We discuss potential modifications to the probing software below.).
Another potential factor in the sensitivity of the automated real-time probe measure (or lack thereof) to squad leader individual differences might have been the use of AARs between training trials. Although the subject squad leaders entered the experiment with different levels of experience in terms of Army deployments, feedback provided during the AARs might have helped put leaders "on an equal footing" in terms of knowledge of SA requirements for the training scenarios (SP and AC). With respect to our data analysis, the level of accuracy of SA across squad leaders might have become more consistent with additional training trials. Related to this, it is also possible that the AARs affected squad leader ratings of cognitive workload. That is, as leader SA improved and they were able to more effectively manage the training scenarios, their perceptions of workload might have decreased and become more consistent across leaders. Of course, it is important from a training perspective that there are improvements in soldier combat SA and decision skills; however, if the objective of application of a probing tool is to identify differences in solider SA based on background, training, experience, and so forth, then the use of AARs in combination with such a tool is not recommended. This also applies to assessment of sol-dier perceived workload in virtual training exercises.
With respect to the results of the training scenario manipulation on the SA probe and workload measures, we intentionally controlled scenario features (time of day, weather, number of squad casualties), in order to ensure comparable levels of "combat" difficulty during training trials. Although the two scenarios posed different goals for the squads, many of the tasks and information processing requirements were comparable. This may also explain why the SA probe measure and workload scores were similar among the scenarios (tests of Hypotheses 2 and 4). In general, the approach we took to the design of scenarios is appropriate for comparing squad leader SA across trials, and for the purpose of evaluating the reliability of SA measures for different training missions. However, if one is interested in identifying how SA might vary from one MOUT to another, scenarios should be designed with different goals, such as maintaining squad safety (like our scenarios) versus deliberate attacks on an enemy in an urban environment. It is likely that in more offensive situations, SA communications and behaviors of leaders would be different than in situations emphasizing civilian safety, as their mission objectives are different.
From an experiment control perspective, the automated real-time probe measure was successful in unobtrusively querying soldier SA, unlike other prior SA measurement methodologies (e.g., SAGAT) that require simulation freezes to test trainees (Endsley, 1995a) . In addition, no trainees suspected questions posed by a platoon leader during trials to be a basis for evaluation of their virtual battlefield knowledge, although the specific probes might have altered a squad leader's pattern of attention.
Frequency Analysis of SA Probes
The development and application of the automated probe delivery system also served as a basis for "sifting" the range of SA requirements listed in our GDTA (on MOUT operations) to identify those commonly considered by experts (the confederate platoon leaders) throughout mission performance. In line with our hypothesis, differences were identified in the highpriority SA requirements between the two training scenarios. In one scenario, experts focused on relative locations of the squad and enemy forces as well as leader ability to predict fires and snipers. In the other scenario, experts focused on SA on specific insurgent threats and squad combat readiness. A common highpriority SA requirement between the scenarios was potential endangerment of civilians and whether squad leaders were keeping track of this.
In general, post-hoc probe frequency analysis provides a basis for identifying specific highpriority SA elements that should be trained in MOUT operations. The analysis can also provide a basis for refining a probe database formulated through cognitive task analysis. This could reduce confederate observer workload in using tools like the APDA and selecting probes during training exercises. This type of analysis and the outcomes identified here have not been generated in previous real-time probe studies (e.g., Jones & Endsley, 2000) .
Behavior and Communication Measures
Opposite to the data collection results for the probe measure, the electronic SA behavior measure (ESABM) and the SA measure of team communications (SAMTC) both provided many opportunities for observations on soldier SA. On average, analysts made 40 behavior ratings per trial across the 27 critical MOUT behaviors. With respect to ratings of SA communications on various elements of MOUT, analysts provided an average of 20 ratings per trial. These results suggest that both measures can provide substantial samples for statistical analyses on the influence of training mission characteristics on SA, even with relatively short training trial time (30 min).
Considering the behavior and communication ratings together, both revealed differences among squad leaders but not between scenarios. We expected squad leaders to have similar challenges demonstrating and communicating SA across the scenarios (Hypothesis 2) because of the specific feature manipulations. It is also important to note that many of the ESABM items are general SA behaviors that may be applicable across MOUT scenarios. This is, in part, based on its origins in the SABARS method (Strater et al., 2001 ). In the ESABM adaptation of the SABARS, there were a few MOUT-specific items that could be considered more or less relevant to one of the scenarios under study. Consequently, some ESABM items may not promote sensitivity of the measurement approach for distinguishing among stability and support operations, deliberate attacks, and so forth. Since the communication ratings were highly correlated with behavior ratings, both ratings showed the same pattern for individual and scenario differences. Although we did not find significant differences in squad leader SA based on the probe measure, this does not invalidate the SA behavior and communication measures. Rather, it suggests squad leaders might have used different strategies, based on their experience and training, to achieve the same level of SA.
Conclusion
In this section, we return to assess the objectives of our study. We also identify limitations of the research, in general, as well as important future research directions for SA measurement system development. The objective of this study was to evaluate the efficacy of a computerbased SA measurement system for training dismounted infantry in MOUT in a VR simulation. This included investigating sensitivity and reliability of several measures to differences in squad leader ability to achieve SA and to various scenario conditions. We prototyped three measurement tools that involved real-time probing of soldiers in exercises and expert observer ratings of communications and behaviors. Results of an experiment with actual infantry squads revealed sensitivity of the ratings to individual differences and showed some promise for capturing SA on critical training events. Soldier subjective ratings of the potential for feedback on such measures to enhance AARs (e.g., understanding when decision or performance problems may have occurred based on SA) and support decision skill development were positive (62% to 91% on a 100% scale).
The three types of SA measures used in the present study provided different insight into soldier SA. For infantry squads participating in training exercises, achieving SA may be seen as a three-step progression requiring them to address the dimensions of the measures we developed. The three steps include developing mission knowledge, demonstrating that knowledge through SA, and communicating SA to squad members; however, failure in one step affects the subsequent steps. A squad leader might have "good" mission knowledge but may be incapable of executing appropriate behaviors that reflect his or her SA and, subsequently, (s)he may commit errors in communicating with team members. As an example, the probe measure indicated the worst performing squad leader knew the battlefield situation because he moved to decent observation points in the VTE on his own. However, the behavior ratings from expert analysts indicated that his decisions concerning squad actions were not consistent with "good" SA. In this way, the suite of SA measures presented here can be used to evaluate the stages of squad leadership and facilitate training to improve one or all levels of SA.
By comparison with established SA questionnaire or freeze techniques, such as SAGAT, the probe methodology is more flexible for application to high-fidelity training systems, like the VR-based trainers used by the Army, or field exercises. Such applications would be difficult with SAGAT, requiring freezes of live training events and having analysts interview soldiers (in place) for SA assessment. The expert ratings of SA behaviors and communications developed in this research may also provide reliable and accurate assessments of solider SA as the SAGAT methodology without obtrusiveness to training performance. In general, all three measurement tools (APDA, ESABM, and SAMTC) have been demonstrated to work with a VTE. The tools can also be further adapted for use in analyzing soldier SA in other virtual training scenarios. In addition, the tools simplify data analysis for researchers by performing calculations of preliminary results and automated database storage.
The main limitation of this study was the small sample of squad leaders. The limited data set made it difficult to reliably assess the sensitivity of the SA measurement tool to individual differences and scenario conditions. Because SA probes were integrated into normal communications between the confederate platoon leader and squad leader, the number of probes delivered in a trial was limited by both the scenario and the discretion of the platoon leader. However, allowing platoon leaders flexibility in posing various probes during trials supported identification of high-priority SA requirements for specific scenarios. It is also possible that this approach promoted the value of the training exercise for soldiers by ignoring probes that were less relevant, based on the current status of a squad. The alternative would be to require squad leaders to respond to all probes in a database for the purpose of testing the SA probes. Such an approach might lead to artificial communications by a platoon leader and high cognitive workload for squad leaders. Future studies should focus on achieving a balance between unobtrusiveness and reliability of the real-time probe measure.
Other potential limitations of the study were related to experiment control. For example, only one expert was used for behavior and communication ratings for each trial, and different platoon leaders were used for the two scenarios. These steps might have contributed to the degree of sensitivity of the analyses on the SA probes.
In order to improve sensitivity of the realtime SA probe measure in future exercises, the APDA tool is to be made more flexible to allow platoon leaders to pose any probe (in the database of MOUT SA requirements) at any time in a training scenario. Platoon leaders will not be constrained to subsets of probes associated with virtual probe markers in the VTE that a squad might encounter. The software will also be enhanced to allow platoon leaders to select (in real time) key elements of MOUT (e.g., weapons, friendlies, enemies, etc.) as bases for probing. They will then select among squad leader goal states (related to a MOUT element), specific task decisions, and specific probes for the goal state. This approach needs to be tested through additional research to determine whether higher numbers of probes can be collected in trials to further support parametric statistical analyses of trainee responses.
Further research is needed to define administration approaches that lead to sensitivity of all measures to training scenario manipulations for supporting AAR feedback on soldier SA skills. Beyond this, research should be conducted to assess the potential applicability of the real-time SA probe measurement system (APDA tool) for use in field training exercises. Such testing could be accomplished through technologies similar to those used in the present study, including: (1) a wireless squad communication network; (2) portable tablet PCs for use by confederate platoon leaders to select SA probes and for use by training analysts to rate squad leader behaviors and communications; and (3) a networked secure server providing platoon leader access to the database of probes and for storing data collected during the field exercise.
